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Abstract
When receiving information about an imminent plant closure or mass layoffs,
workers search for new jobs. This has been the premise of advance notice legis-
lation, but has been difﬁcult to verify using survey data. In this paper, we lay
out a search model that takes explicitly into account the information ﬂow prior
to a mass layoff. Using universal wage data ﬁles that allow us to identify indi-
viduals working with healthy and displacing ﬁrms both at the time of displace-
ment as well as any other time period, we test the predictions of the model on
re-employment wages. Controlling for worker quality and unobservable ﬁrm char-
acteristics, workers leaving a “distressed” ﬁrm have higher re-employment wages
than workers who stay with the distressed ﬁrm until displacement.
JEL CLASSIFICATION: J31 - Wage Level and Structure; J65 - Unemployment
Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings, J63 - Turnover; Vacancies; Layoffs
KEYWORDS: Displaced workers, search theory, advance notice, linked ﬁrm-
worker data sets.March 20, 2002 2
1 Introduction
Displaced workers have been the subject of an extensive literature. The basic styl-
ized facts were established by Jacobson, LaLonde & Sullivan (1993): when compared
to continuously employed workers, displaced workers suffer an earnings dip prior to
displacement, and recovery from displacement is long and persistent, both in terms of
work experience and earnings.1 Other work has studied the effects of advance knowl-
edge of displacement on the outcomes of displaced workers.2 These studies point to
the unemployment-lowering effect of advance notice (mostly through a reduction in
the incidence of unemployment as opposed to shorter unemployment spells), but also
to the apparent endogeneity of the provision of advance notice (Fallick 1994, Jones
& Kuhn 1995, Ruhm 1992). Firms provide advance notice to workers likely to suffer
from prolonged periods of unemployment, although this might be due to a correlation
of advance notice with other unobserved characteristics of the ﬁrm (Ruhm (1994) for
US data, Jones & Kuhn (1995) using Canadian data).
Most of these studies suffer from a distinct data problem. Generally, these stud-
ies use the Displaced Worker Supplement (DWS) to the Current Population Survey
(CPS). All but the 1984 and 1986 DWS have no information on whether workers left
before the layoff date speciﬁed in the advance notice received, and thus cannot iden-
tify and follow early leavers. Furthermore, since the CPS is a cross-sectional survey,
it is not possible to follow workers or their ﬁrms for prolonged periods of time. For
instance, it is not possible to compare displaced workers to continuously employed
workers at the same ﬁrm in other time periods,3 and to the best of our knowledge,
only Abowd & Finer (1997) have contrasted displaced workers and early leavers at
the same ﬁrm. Even when it is possible to follow workers over longer periods of time
(Storer & Van Audenrode 1998, using Canadian panel data) or to observe multiple
workers within the same ﬁrm (Jones & Kuhn 1995, using Ontario data), the studies
involved typically could not distinguish early leavers from workers present at dis-
placement.
The work on advance notice to displaced workers relies implicitly on search mod-
els. In fact, the rationale behind mandatory notice laws in Canada and the US is
to give workers a chance to search while on the job, rather than being surprised by
displacement and searching from the disadvantaged position of unemployment. How-
ever, no formal structural model of search that incorporates features of displacement,
including the possibility of leaving the displacing ﬁrm prior to a mass layoff, has been
proposed and estimated in the literature, potentially missing many behavioral pat-
1See Fallick (1996) and Kletzer (1998) for overviews and Abe, Higuchi, Kuhn & Sweetman (forth-
coming), Abbring, van den Berg, Gautier, Gijsbert, van Lomwel & Ruhm (forthcoming), and Farber
(1999) for more recent analyses involving Canadian and US data
2Addison & Portugal (1987), Jones & Kuhn (1995), Ruhm (1992, 1994), Swaim & Podgursky (1990).
See also Table 5 in Storer & Van Audenrode (1998).
3A notable exception is Jacobson et al. (1993).March 20, 2002 3
terns and linkages that one should be looking for around displacement.
In Section 2, we construct a partial equilibrium search-theoretic model that allows
for the possibility of surprise announcements of future displacement. This announce-
ment may be formal in the form of mandatory advance notice, or informal, through
information diffusion (the internal grapevine) within the company, or even through
announcement in the public media without any formal notiﬁcation of workers. Sev-
eral of the theoretical implications from this model are tested using a unique new
American dataset, described in Section 3. In particular, this dataset allows us to
compute in which period a mass layoff occurs, where the deﬁnition of a mass layoff
is very ﬂexible and does not require administrative reporting or survey-based sam-
pling. Although lacking a worker report on the actual receipt of information, we do
observe workers leaving (and entering) the ﬁrm prior to the displacement period.
Lengermann & Vilhuber (2000), using the same data, report signiﬁcant changes in
the distribution of worker skills in the periods prior to displacement. Both based
on that study and on the coverage of legislated advance notice, we infer that these
movements are due to increased knowledge of impending layoffs. The dataset also
allows us to match workers to both pre- and post-displacement ﬁrms, and to follow
their earnings path for prolonged periods of time. Section 4 outlines the estimation
methods used and reports results, and Section 5 concludes.
2 A Search Model of Displacement
2.1 Model assumptions
A starting point for understanding the labor market transitions of workers in the
ﬁrms in question is the following partial equilibrium model of search with notice or
information of impending displacement. Workers search on the job as well as off the
job, in line with most other search models (Mortensen 1986). When unemployed, they
receive job offers at rate 0, when on the job at rate 1. Those that receive acceptable
job offers leave current employment or unemployment for the new employer. When
searching, workers take the wage offer distribution F(w) as given. The value of non-
market time while unemployed is b, and jobs are exogenously dissolved at rate 1. The
discount rate is denoted by r.
In order to introduce some of the features of displacement into this model, the
following assumptions are made. First, at rate 1, employed workers receive infor-
mation of impending mass layoff. After receipt of this information, which might be
formal notice or informal information gathered by other means ( the term “notice” is
used without implying any formal notice), all participants expect job destruction to
occur at rate 2 > 1. Mass layoffs are modeled as being stochastic, so workers do notMarch 20, 2002 4
know the precise moment of mass layoff. This is designed to resemble the large vari-
ation in actual notice received by workers across ﬁrms (Jones & Kuhn 1995). Layoffs
(exits) can and do occur at ﬁrms that have not issued notice of a mass layoff.
Second, the fraction of ﬁrms in the notice state is given by gamma, and it is as-
sumed that these ﬁrms do not participate in the hiring process.4 Although this is
probably empirically true for plant closures, it is not quite true for mass layoffs in
which the ﬁrm continues operations.5 However, in this partial equilibrium model,
this assumption only affects from where workers expect to receive wage offers. Since
the proportion of ﬁrms in the notice state at any given point in time is small,6 this
assumption is a close approximation of the true distribution of wage offers, and facil-
itates the analysis.
Third, when a worker receives notice, there is no downgrading of the wage. Again,
this might seem to contradict the empirical evidence of a dip in earnings prior to
displacement,7 but this ﬁnding is not universally upheld in the data.8 The actual
mechanism behind the dip in earnings is not yet fully understood. It may reﬂect
changes in hours of work at a constant wage rate or selection on early leavers. In
future work, this can be relaxed.
Fourth, the distressed state is an absorbing state. A ﬁrm, once it has given notice,
never reverts to a non-distressed state. This is an assumption that would be relaxed
in a general equilibrium model, either by specifying the entry of new ﬁrms, or a pro-
cess describing reversion to a non-distressed state, in order to achieve an equilibrium
with positive steady-state employment.
No further constraints are imposed on the model at this stage. In particular, the
worker’s reservation wage strategies for all four possible transitions (employment -
unemployment, notice - unemployment, notice - employment, unemployment - em-
ployment) are in no way constrained.
4In this, our model differs from Burdett & Mortensen (1980). In their model, jobs are characterized
by their permanent or temporary layoff probabilities ex ante. Here, all jobs have the same ex ante
probability of becoming notice jobs, and only differ ex post.
5Lengermann & Vilhuber (2000) provide empirical evidence of increased hiring activities at ﬁrms
prior to displacement events.
6In our data, in any given quarter, approximately 1.3 percent of ﬁrms have a displacement event,
see Section 3.
7This was ﬁrst established by Jacobson et al. (1993).
8See f.i. Schoeni & Dardia (1996) for an example using data similar to ours.March 20, 2002 5
2.2 Value Functions for Employment and Unemployment
The value of employment in a non-notice ﬁrm with wage w is given by
rVE(w) = w + 1 (1   
)[maxfVE(w
0);VE(w)g   VE(w)]
+1 (VU   VE(w)) + 1 [maxfVU;V
n
E(w)g   VE(w)]: (1)
While employed the worker receives wage w. With probability 1 (1   
) the worker
receives an outside wage offer w0 from a non-notice ﬁrm which she can either accept
or reject. With probability 1 she is laid off and with probability 1 she receives notice
of an impending mass layoff. Upon receipt of notice she has to decide whether to stay
employed at the notice ﬁrm or go into unemployment.
The value of employment at a notice ﬁrm with wage w is given by
rV
n







+2 (VU   V
n
E(w)): (2)
Here the worker receives outside offers from non-notice ﬁrms and must decide to
accept or reject them. He now has a higher chance of ending up in unemployment
(2 > 1).
The value of unemployment, Vu, is given by
rVU = b + 0 (1   
)[maxfVE(w);VUg   VU]: (3)
While unemployed, workers have non-market time value b and receive wage offers
with probability 0 (1   
), which they can either accept or reject.
2.3 Reservation Wage Strategies
Under the above setup workers will have four state dependent reservation wage
strategies.9 While employed at a non-notice ﬁrm and receiving offers from other non-
notice ﬁrms, it is well known that the current wage w is the reservation wage, i.e.
any wage offer above w is accepted. This is still the case in this model. However,
the current wage is likely not the reservation wage for those employed at notice ﬁrms
contemplating non-notice ﬁrm offers. Hence, label r(w) the reservation wage function
for those employed at notice ﬁrms at wage w such that VE(r(w)) = V n
E(w). Label w
the reservation wage of unemployed workers such that VE(w) = VU. Finally, label
9Transitions from the non-notice to the notice state of employment do not occur voluntarily, and
transitions from unemployment into the notice state have been excluded. If notice ﬁrms were to hire,
both of these transitions would have an associated reservation wage strategy.March 20, 2002 6
r the reservation wage associated with the transition to unemployment when faced
with notice such that V n
E(r) = VU.
Given these reservation wage strategies the above value functions can be rewrit-
ten as follows. From (1),






0) + 1 (VU   VE(w))
+1 (VU   VE(w)) (4)
if w  r,






0) + 1 (VU   VE(w))
+1 (V
n
E(w)   VE(w)) (5)
if w > r. From (2),
rV
n














rVU = b + 0 (1   
)
Z w
w (VE(w)   VU)dF(w): (8)
where w is the highest wage offered.
To solve for w and r set VE(w) = VU and V n
E(r) = VU, respectively, under the
conjecture that w  r. This is the most reasonable conjecture since the expectation
is that the non-notice jobs are more attractive than the notice jobs and therefore one is
more picky about keeping a notice job, i.e. VE(w)  V n
E(w). Note that by the deﬁnition
of r(w), r(r) = w. Solving for w and r yields.
w

















Since VE(w) = V n
E(r) = VU by deﬁnition, the formulas for w and r are the same
and therefore w = r. Thus we have the ﬁrst result. At the time of notice workers
always opt to stay employed; there is no voluntary exit to unemployment to search for
another non-notice job.
We now turn to solving for r(w), the reservation wage while employed at a notice
ﬁrm. The conjecture here is that r(w) will be less than w. That is, workers willMarch 20, 2002 7
accept a lower wage at a non-notice ﬁrm in order to escape the higher likelihood of
unemployment. To solve for r(w) we set VE(r(w)) = V n
E(w). This yields
r(w) = w + (1   2)(V
n
E(w)   VU) + 1 (VE(r(w))   V
n
E(r(w)))
r(w) = w + (1   2)(V
n





r(w) = w +
1   2





























To show that r(w) < w we rearrange the above expression for r(w).
(r + 2 + 1 (1   
)(1   F(r(w))) + 1)(r(w)   w)
= (1   2)
"
w   w
















The term on the left hand side that is multiplied by (r(w)   w) is positive because

 and F(r(w)) are less than or equal to 1. The ﬁrst term on the right hand side
is negative because 1 < 2 and V n
E(w) > VU for all w > w (see ﬁrst line of r(w)
expression). The second term on the right hand side is positive because the expression
in the integral is positive over the integrated wage range, i.e. VE(w0)  V n
E(r(w)) for
r(r(w))  w  r(w). Therefore r(w)   w must be negative or r(w) < w.
The equalization of values at the reservation wage (VE(w) = V n
E(w)) is a surpris-
ing ﬁnding given the intuition about the value of non-notice jobs being higher than
the value of notice jobs. However, we will see that this holds only at the reservation
wage and otherwise the intuition follows through. To show that VE(w) > V n
E(w) for
w > w we subtract V n
E(w) from VE(w). After rearranging we have
(r + 1 + 1 (1   
)(1   F(r(w))) + 1)(VE(w)   V
n
E(w))






0) + (2   1)(V
n
E(w)   VU):
The ﬁrst term on the left hand side is positive because 
 and F(r(w)) are less than or
equal to 1. The ﬁrst term on the right hand side is positive because VE(w) VE(w0) > 0
since r(w) < w and therefore w > w0. The second term on the right hand side is
positive because by assumption 2 > 1 and V n
E(w) > VU since w > w. Therefore
VE(w) > V n
E(w).March 20, 2002 8
2.4 Predictions
The model as outlined generates a number of predictions. First, there are differences
in observed re-employment wages among the three groups of workers - workers leav-
ing non-notice ﬁrms, workers leaving notice ﬁrms, and workers laid off by notice ﬁrms.
The reservation strategies at notice and non-notice ﬁrms immediately imply that ac-
cepted wage offers are lower for workers in the second group, conditional on wages at
the old ﬁrm. Furthermore, once displaced, displaced workers are indistinguishable
from other unemployed, who follow a reservation wage strategy deﬁned by w. Since
w < r(w) < w for all w > w, it then follows that workers at notice ﬁrms who sepa-
rate prior to displacement will on average have higher accepted wages than displaced
workers. Thus, conditional on pre-separation wages, the average wage gains observed
in the data should decline monotonically across the three groups. This is the primary
prediction that will be tested in this paper.
Second, there are no voluntary exits at time of notice, but the quitting likelihood
increases at notice ﬁrms. Since the layoff decision by the ﬁrm is assumed to be ex-
ogenous, this implies that the overall separation likelihood also increases at notice
ﬁrms. Some support for this prediction was found by Lengermann & Vilhuber (2000),
who reported that for some skill groups separations increased above the ﬁrm-speciﬁc
mean separation rate up to four quarters before a mass layoff.
3 Data
The data used here were extracted from the Longitudinal Employer and Household
Dynamics (LEHD) Program database. The database contains, among other data
sources, unemployment insurance (UI) records for several U.S. states covering the
1990s. UI records contain quarterly earnings on all workers covered by the unem-
ployment insurance system10 in a given state, all linked to their respective employers.
One can thus build a precise picture of the sequencing of employment in conjunction
with earnings at each job. The LEHD database augments the UI records with basic
demographic information (education, age, race, and sex).11 Experience is calculated
as potential experience at observed entry into the data, and updated with actual ob-
served experience at subsequent points in time.
The data set shares a number of advantages as well as a few disadvantages with
10 Only a small fraction of workers in jobs not subject to state employment taxes are missed. This in-
cludes Federal employees, self-employed individuals, and employees of small agricultural enterprises,
and philanthropic or religious organizations. Individuals who receive no salary, who are completely
dependent on commissions, and who work with no ﬁxed location or home base are also excluded.
11Education is known for a subsample of the population, and multiply imputed for the rest. In this
paper, only one imputation was used. Age, race, and sex are known for all respondents.March 20, 2002 9
previous work on displaced workers using unemployment insurance records. On the
positive side, it provides a very large sample of displaced workers whose earnings can
be tracked over long periods of time both before and after displacement. Furthermore,
information on ﬁrm employment changes as well as individual earnings should be
relatively free of measurement error. On the minus side, our analysis is limited to a
handful of states, demographic information is not as extensive as in the typical survey,
and layoffs cannot be distinguished from quits. Finally, UI records, because they
(typically) contain no information on hours worked, do not allow for the distinction
between full- and part-time work.
A “ﬁrm” in our empirical work refers to the UI reporting unit, i.e. the account
attributed to a ﬁrm by the state agencies responsible for UI taxes. Such an account
number may cover multiple establishments, however, more than 90% of accounts are
known to be single-establishment entities.
Crucial to the analysis is the identiﬁcation of a displacement “event”. The data set
contains information on all movements in and out of ﬁrms, but no administrative or
survey reports of displacement (as would be contained in the Mass Layoff Statistics).
One of the strengths of the data is that the sensitivity of the result to the deﬁnition
of displacement can be explored. In the analysis presented here, a “displacement”
is deemed to occur when observed job separations surpass 30 % of maximum ﬁrm
employment (Jacobson et al. 1993). Average employment is required to be larger than
50 workers. In order to properly capture the element of surprise notice postulated by
the theoretical model, we restrict our analysis to ﬁrms that are observed to have
only one displacement event.12;13 The displacement event for any given worker is
identiﬁed not from a survey report, but from observed movements out of employment
at that worker’s ﬁrm. Thus, issues of recall bias or multiple displacement that have
plagued the Displaced Worker Supplements (DWS) to the Current Population Survey
(Farber 1998) are not of relevance here.
Table 1 on page 21 compares statistics based on the displacement measure in our
data with the DWS. Farber (2001) tabulates multiple years of data drawn from the
DWS, corrected to be consistent as survey questions changed over time. Since the
DWS is retrospective survey querying (in this tabulation) about job displacements in
the three years before the survey date, we adjusted our data to give a similar picture.
1234.9 percent of all ﬁrms having at least one displacement event have multiple displacement events.
Inspection of the data reveals that a large fraction look like temporary layoffs of more than one quarter
in length; however, very cyclical ﬁrms will appear to have multiple “displacements” in the data. The
restriction used here is designed to eliminate these cyclical layoff patterns.
13Temporary layoffs of less than three months length are difﬁcult to observe in the data, because of
low frequency of the data. A worker being laid off sometime in Quarter 1, and recalled sometime in
Quarter 2, potentially up to one day less than 6 months later, will nevertheless appear to be continually
employed in the UI wage records, albeit with lower earnings, since positive earnings appear in every
quarter. The extreme case of a ﬁrm laying off its entire workforce on January 2 and rehiring every
single one of its former employees on June 29 will be invisible to the algorithm.March 20, 2002 10
Thus, we computed for every worker in our sample whether he or she experienced
at least one displacement within a three-year rolling window. This is approximately
equivalent to a DWS-like question asked of these respondents at the end of the third
calendar year. The higher frequency of sampling possible in the LEHD data allows for
a more detailed analysis than the DWS data.14 When comparing the equivalent three-
year reference periods, only three years are common to both data sets. Excluding the
1993 numbers as being unreliable, the numbers in 1995 and 1997 are comparable,
though slightly higher than in the LEHD data set, suggesting that our deﬁnition
of displacement is close to what workers in the DWS understand by displacement.
Furthermore, the LEHD data do not show the strong downward trend apparent in
the DWS since 1995. The difference in the two measures is presumably due to both
deﬁnitional issues on the LEHD data, and recall bias on the DWS data, and is being
investigated further.
In all, 5 227 ﬁrms had displacement events as deﬁned above during the 1990-1998
period, out of a total of 15 560 ﬁrms satisfying the size requirement. Although the
ratio of ﬁrms ever experiencing displacement seems high, note that this corresponds
to a probability of less than 1.3 percent of any given company having a displacement
in any given period. Within a twelve quarter window leading up to displacement,
slightly more than 3 million workers worked for these ﬁrms for at least one quarter.
We construct a sample designed to address some of the sample selection and data
quality issues. First, only earnings from “full-quarter employment” quarters are used.
Under the full quarter assumption, a worker is counted as working for a ﬁrm for the
entire period t if and only if she appears at the same ﬁrm in periods t   1 and t + 1.
This is designed to correct for the problem of unobservable hours.
Second, we select individuals who were in “full-quarter employment” four quar-
ters before the displacement event, continually employed until the separation, and
who were in “full-quarter employment” four quarters after separating from the dis-
placing ﬁrm (which means they found new employment or were recalled to their old
job by the third post-separation quarter). This sample will not include the typical dis-
placed worker who experiences a long unemployment spell.15 Rather, it will include
those displaced workers who, like the early leavers, found a job fairly quickly. Other
variables (such as experience or the size of the ﬁrm) are taken from the beginning
of the pre-displacement period or the end of the post-displacement period here un-
der consideration, as appropriate. Unemployment duration is computed between the
quarter separation occurred and the ﬁrst quarter of observed positive earnings with
any ﬁrm.
14A data quality issue seems to be at the root of the very high displacement rates in 1991 and 1992.
Observations from years before 1993 are excluded from the analysis. Future updates to the database
will hopefully resolve this problem.
15Mean unemployment is around 27 weeks in the CPS (Ruhm 1992).March 20, 2002 11
The resulting sample contains data on approximately 30 000 men who are present
in all periods 3 to 5 quarters before a ﬁrm’s displacement event, as well as working in
periods 3 to 5 after having left the displacing ﬁrm, either as an “early leaver” or as a
displaced worker.16
4 Estimation and Results
The base wage equation is an expanded version of the generic displaced worker re-
gression (Jacobson et al. 1993). Let Tdispl;j denote the displacement date of employer
j. Let Tdepart;i;j denote worker i’s separation date from employer j. Finally, let J(i;t)
be the function identifying worker i’s employer at time t.











J(i;t) is unity if displacement will occur in   periods at the worker i’s cur-
rent employing ﬁrm J(i;t) (i.e. t   Tdispl;J(i;t) = ). m denotes how many periods in
advance this vector of dummies is started. For instance,  1 measures the effect of
next period’s displacement on the present period’s earnings.
The pre-displacement dummies are speciﬁc to a ﬁrm and likely apply to that ﬁrm’s
entire workforce, whether or not any particular member of that workforce is actually
displaced at Tdispl;j. In particular, workers leaving at some time Tdepart;i;j < Tdispl;j,
whom we will call “early leavers”, are likely to experience similar wage changes as
“displaced workers” in the stricter sense (Tdepart;i;j = Tdispl;j), up to the time of depar-
ture from the ﬁrm.
On the other hand, the post-displacement effects on wages are worker speciﬁc,
independent of the ﬁrm that they work at after separation or displacement. The effect
of person-speciﬁc post-displacement dummies DIit can be constructed in a similar










i is unity if a worker left a displacing ﬁrm  periods ago (i.e. for some j, t  
Tdepart;i;j =  and m > Tdispl;j  Tdepart;i;j). For instance, 4 measures the effect of having
worked at a displacing ﬁrm one year ago on this period’s earnings. The notation
here corresponds to that in Jacobson et al. (1993) for workers with Tdispl;j = Tdepart;i;j.
However, the post-displacement dummies are person-speciﬁc, and are a function of
the worker’s employment history.
16More details on the construction of the data set are available in Appendix A on page 28.March 20, 2002 12
Both Equations (12) and (13) assume that the earnings patterns related to dis-
placement are the same for early leavers and displaced workers. This assumption
can be relaxed. Let ei;t;J(i;t) = 1( m  Tdepart;i;j   Tdispl;j < 0) ﬂag early leavers from




J(i;t)1 = DJ 0





i 2 = DI 0
i 21  (1   ei;t;J(i;t)) + (15)
DI 0
i 22  ei;t;J(i;t)
Assembling all the elements deﬁned above yields the basic wage speciﬁcation:




i;t2 + i +  J(i;t) + "it (16)
where wit measures log earnings for individual i at time t, Xit are individual character-
istics, both time-varying and time-invariant, i measures the effect of time-invariant
individual characteristics (“worker quality”),  J(i;t) is a ﬁrm-speciﬁc (productivity) ef-
fect on wages. "it is a statistical residual, uncorrelated with all the right hand side
variables.17 In our data, Xit includes a quadratic in experience, education, race, and
year.
In this paper, we consider persons who worked for the same ﬁrm during the same
time period prior to a displacement event, and who either left early (within two quar-
ters of the displacement quarter) or who were displaced. Their pre-displacement
earnings a year before the displacement event are then compared to earnings a full
year after separation from their previous ﬁrm. In the case of early leavers, this is
computed not from the date the ﬁrm displaced its remaining workers, but from the
date they left the ﬁrm. In terms of the above deﬁned variables, all these individu-
als satisfy DJ
 4










J(i) = 1. Differencing (16) obtains











i;postei;t;J(i;t) (22   21) (17)
+  J(i;post)    J(i;pre) + "i
where we have assumed that pre-displacement wage paths are identical within the
displacing ﬁrm for both early leavers and displaced workers (12 = 11 = 1 in (14)).
Rewriting,
wi;post   wi;pre =  + Xi
+ ei;t;J(i;t) +  J(i;post)    J(i;pre) + ~ "i (18)
17See Abowd & Kramarz (1999) for a more detailed description of this model.March 20, 2002 13
where  = 21 1 is the component for all workers ﬁnding employment post-displacement,
Xi = Xi;post   Xi;pre captures any changes in time-varying observables,18 and  =
22   21 is the difference in post-displacement earnings due solely to the fact that
some workers left earlier than others, and all the displacement dummies are set to
unity due to sample selection. Note in particular that  no longer plays a role in (18)
because of ﬁrst-differencing, but that   still enters for two different ﬁrms.
The starting point of this analysis are the ﬁrst two rows of Table 2. The ﬁrst row
shows the raw earnings differential between the fourth predisplacement quarter and
the fourth post-displacement quarter. The second row shows the differential when
computed using “full-quarter” earnings, as deﬁned earlier. The difference between the
two columns is a ﬁrst estimate of the parameter of interest , and both difference-
in-differences tell the same story: Earnings for early leavers are signiﬁcantly higher
than for workers from the same ﬁrms who stay until displaced, by approximately 10
percent if using full-quarter earnings, and by more than thirteen percent when using
raw quarterly earnings, consistent with the search model outlined earlier.
The table also reveals marked differences between the groups. Levels of earnings
are lower for early leavers, as is their age, experience, and education. Early leavers
leave smaller ﬁrms, but also move to smaller ﬁrms. The racial composition is also
more diverse among early leavers. There are small differences in the estimated per-
son ﬁxed effect, a measure of long-term earnings potential, but both groups are quite
close to the population average of zero. However, there are larger differences in the
ﬁxed effect of ﬁrms for which they work before and after separation, a measure of
pay policy differences. The more seasoned displaced workers separate from higher-
paying ﬁrms than the early leavers, and also ﬁnd new jobs in such ﬁrms, but the early
leavers experience a larger improvement. This ﬁnding is again consistent with the
search model.
The search model implies that at least for early leavers, transitions occur directly
from one job to the next with no intervening unemployment. Empirically, we observe
positive unemployment spells for both groups of workers, as well as substantial recall
for displaced workers. To more closely approximate the requirements of the model,
we restrict our sample further to those experiencing at most one period of unemploy-
ment, and tabulate the characteristics of this subsample in Table 3 on page 23. Most
workers in both categories still experience some unemployment. The FQ difference-
in-difference increases to nearly 18 percent, and the raw difference-in-difference to
over 22 percent. But other characteristics also change. The difference in  is now
more marked, and reversed in favor of early leavers. Both types of separators now
work in more similarly sized ﬁrms before and after separation. The fraction of tem-
porary layoffs falls dramatically. On the other hand, the ﬁxed effects of pre- and
post-separation ﬁrms are quite similar to the full sample, although both groups make
larger improvements. The fraction of industry stayers remains essentially unchanged
18In practice, the data we use has few or no time-varying observables.March 20, 2002 14
for early leavers, but decreases slightly for displaced workers, despite the elimination
of most recalls.
Many of the differences noted in Tables 2 and 3 are correlated with wage levels,
and in the further analysis, we will use regressions based on Equation (18) to disen-
tangle the determinants of wage levels from the more basic implication of the search
model, namely that the wage difference is due to the fact that the early leavers re-
ceived a better draw than the displaced workers. 19
Table 4 on page 24 presents results from a series of OLS speciﬁcations using
the full sample described by Table 2. Column (1) builds on the basic difference-in-
difference (DID) comparison done in the ﬁrst row of Table 2 by controlling for a num-
ber of person-speciﬁc observables as well as the time difference between the two wage
measurements. Although in particular the experience and education variables have
a signiﬁcant impact on the log wage differential, the estimate of  remains virtually
unchanged from the naive DID.
Column (2) estimates Equation (18) using independently estimated ﬁrm ﬁxed ef-
fects. The estimation of these ﬁrm ﬁxed effects is described in Appendix A on page 28.
In this speciﬁcation, a ﬁrm will have the same ﬁxed effect whether it is a displacing
ﬁrm, a new ﬁrm, or both.20 Controlling for estimated ﬁrm ﬁxed effects reduces the dif-
ference due to early leavers, but the latter still remains economically and statistically
signiﬁcant.21 Column (3) augments Equation (18) with the person-speciﬁc character-
istics, which slightly increases . The controls included in the base speciﬁcation do
not alter the conclusion from the raw data: Early leavers earn more than displaced
workers with similar characteristics.
It could be argued that among early leavers, workers with higher search intensi-
ties (represented in the search model by 0 and 1) are over-represented, and a control
for the unobserved ability associated with higher search intensity or success should be
controlled for. Since a higher search intensity leads to faster wage growth, omission
of such a variable would lead to an overestimate of .
No direct measure of search intensity is available in the data. On the other hand,
covariates such as experience may already control for differences in search intensity,
19The other major implication, the difference between workers of non-notice ﬁrms who change jobs
and early leavers from notice ﬁrms, will be tested in a later revision of this paper.
20Of the 5,343 new ﬁrms on the full analysis data set, 1,525 are also displacing ﬁrms (51.8 % of all
displacing ﬁrms). When restricting the sample to workers with no more than one quarter of interven-
ing unemployment, which eliminates a large fraction of recalls, only 566 are also displacing ﬁrms (26.7
% of all displacing ﬁrms).
21Note that the coefﬁcient on ^  J(i;pre) according to the Equation (18) should be negative unity, and
that on ^  J(i;post) should be positive unity. The signiﬁcant deviation from that value might indicate of a
time-varying component to ﬁrm pay policies not well captured by the base regression used to estimate
these variables.March 20, 2002 15
since younger workers might have higher search intensities. In all columns, experi-
ence is negatively linked to earnings growth, consistent with the usual perception of
a concave experience proﬁle. Column (4) introduces a different control. We include
the estimated person ﬁxed effect ^ . If higher average earnings are a product of faster
wage growth, then ^  is correlated with a higher search intensity. Table 4 shows that
^  is positively correlated with the wage gap for all workers.22 However, conditional
on ^ , the gap between early leavers and displaced workers is actually slightly higher
than when ^  is not included, suggesting if anything that ^  is negatively correlated
with search intensity.
One feature of Table 4 is the strong impact of temporary layoffs. While the coefﬁ-
cient on the temporary layoff ﬂag allows to evaluate the strength of the observed wage
growth of early leavers - early leavers gain 3 to 4 percent more than workers who re-
turned to their old jobs and presumably pay schedules - it also begs the question of
whether or not the base comparison group of displaced workers is appropriately cho-
sen. Over 60 percent of displaced workers eventually return to their jobs in the base
sample. However, temporary layoffs also experience much longer unemployment pe-
riods, and in Table B.1 on page 31 in the Appendix, we have restricted the analysis to
the sample described in Table 3. Among those workers having experienced no more
than one quarter of intervening unemployment, only 7 percent of displaced workers
return to their pre-displacement jobs. This sample, as previously explained, is also
closer to what the theory describes. Among these workers, the naive DID estimator
of  is 0.178. The level of the estimated  = 0:113 is higher, but the conclusion
reached based on Table 4 is unaltered.
Tables 4 and B.1 used estimated ﬁrm ﬁxed effects. It is however feasible to ex-
plicitly re-estimate ﬁxed effects, separately for displacing and receiving ﬁrms.23 Ta-
ble 5 on page 25 reports results from an OLS regression which explicitly estimated
ﬁxed effects for all 2,942 displacing ﬁrms and all 5,343 new ﬁrms, based on the full
sample.24 Column (1) corresponds to the basic speciﬁcation of Equation (18), and
compares directly to column (2) of Table 4. Explicitly re-estimating the ﬁxed effects
actually results in a higher estimated , which again is very close to the naive DID
estimator. The (cumulative) addition of person-speciﬁc characteristics in column (2)
and ^  in column (3) do not alter the estimated coefﬁcient signiﬁcantly.
Column (4) of Table 5 investigates some of the sources of the large wage gains ob-
served for early leavers by distinguishing between those whose new job was found in
22^  is estimated, but we are interested only in the signiﬁcance of the coefﬁcient on ^ , ^ , since we
have no priors as to what value it should have. For the hypothesis test ^  = 0, the OLS standard errors
are consistent and t-statistics valid (Pagan 1984).
23Contrary to the previous regressions, a ﬁrm that is at once a displacing ﬁrm for some workers and
a new ﬁrm for others will have two different ﬁxed effects, depending on the role it plays towards each
worker.
24Table B.2 on page 32 reports results for the same speciﬁcations based on the sample with restricted
unemployment. The conclusions remain the same.March 20, 2002 16
the same industry as the displacing job, and those who switched industries. Tables 2
and 3 reported that the fraction of early leavers who stayed within the same indus-
try when switching jobs was signﬁcantly lower than for displaced workers, though a
majority did not change industries. The coefﬁcients reported in column (4) indicate
that much of the wage gain is due to individuals who change industries. Nevertheles,
even those who ﬁnd new jobs in the same industry make higher wage gains than do
displaced workers who stay in the same industry.
To further explore the correlation between observable characteristics, ^ , and the
likelihood of being an early leaver, Table 6 on page 26 presents results for the likeli-
hood of leaving a displacing ﬁrm early from a probit speciﬁcation. Column (1) includes
demographics and year dummies. Workers who leave the ﬁrm early tend to be less
educated, and tend to come from smaller ﬁrms. Conditional on the other variables,
experience is linked to a positive and convex likelihood of leaving early, contrary to
the difference in unconditional sample means reported in Table 2 on page 22, and
in contrast to the earlier hypothesis that experience is negatively correlated with a
higher search intensity.25 Racial background also seems to matter, with blacks and
hispanics more likely to leave than whites and other racial groups.
The addition of ^  J(i;pre) in column (2) and of ^  J(i;post) does not alter the effect of
other variables. Both estimated ﬁrm ﬁxed effects are negatively correlated with the
likelihood of departure, reﬂecting the observations from the different sample means.
Finally, the addition of the person ﬁxed effect in column (4) does reduce the impact
of racial indicators, suggesting different population averages of long-term wage lev-
els across these groups. However, the effect of ^  is negatively correlated with the
likelihood of leaving, contrary to what should be expected if ^  were correlated with a
higher search intensity, but consistent with the OLS results. The general picture, in
particular the effect of experience and education, is not affected.
Even though the probit results reinforce the previous OLS results, they do indi-
cate that the controls included in the speciﬁcations from Table 4 may not fully control
for heterogeneity in the sample. The primary focus of the search model is on homo-
geneous workers. One way of introducting heterogeneity into the model is through
segmented labor markets. Workers are homogeneous within, but not across labor
markets.
Table 7 reports results from separating the restricted analysis sample into four
sub-groups, based on the population distribution of ^ , in order to obtain homogeneous
sub-populations. Each column is equivalent to the speciﬁcation used in column (4)
from Table 4, when estimating OLS for each of the subgroups separately. Even though
the groups are selected within quartiles of the distribution of ^ , ^  is still included in
the regression as a control.
25The sample includes only persons with more than 20 quarters of labor market experience. Over
the range of feasible values in the data, the experience terms are positive.March 20, 2002 17
The parameter of interest  is signiﬁcant in all but the lowest quartile, and is
of the same order of magnitude as for the sample as a whole, but varies signiﬁcantly
across the distribution of ^ . Also, the included ^  is signiﬁcant only for the bottom quar-
tile. The second row of the table shows means and standard errors of ^  within each
quartile, and not surprisingly, the variation (and range) of ^  in the top and bottom
quartiles is far larger than in the middle of the distribution. Thus, the workers cap-
tured in columns (1) and (4) are far less homogeneous than those workers underlying
the regressions in columns (2) and (3).26
5 Conclusion
One of the primary concerns of policy makers when faced with mass layoffs is how to
quickly return these individuals to work. Mostly, the emphasis has relied on manda-
tory advance notice laws, but their efﬁcacy has only circumstantially been proven.
Firms, on the other hand, might worry about destructive attrition prior to displace-
ment. In particular, if the mass layoff was the result of a plant closure which the
ﬁrm had deemed avoidable, then attrition might have been detrimental to the rescue
attempt.
In this paper, we provide some evidence that a solution to these competing in-
centives is non-trivial. We lay out a search model that incorporates aspects of dis-
placement, in particular the receipt of information as to the viability of a worker’s job
(which here is interpreted be related to a mass layoff). Workers endogenously adapt
their reservation wages to changed circumstances. The model predicts that workers
who have received “notice” of a higher job failure risk, will adjust their reservation
wages downwards. This implies that their departure from the ﬁrm is more likely than
if they had not received this information, and furthermore that their re-employment
wages will lie below normal re-employment wages, but above the wages obtained by
displaced and other unemployed job seekers.
The data, obtained from US universal wage record data, support these conclu-
sions. The data is used to determine when mass layoffs occur, and then compares
those workers who left up to 2 quarters prior to the mass layoff with workers dis-
placed at the time of the mass layoff. The results indicate that within categories of
homogenous workers, and controlling for characteristics of workers and displacing
ﬁrms, early leavers consistently obtain higher re-employment wages than displaced
workers, except for workers at the low end of the labor market.
Although the data do not report if these workers had received formal advance
26Not reported here, probit estimation by quartiles of ^ , of Table 6 yielded similar results. Once
ﬁrm characteristics have been controlled for, ^  is no longer signiﬁcantly related to early exit from the
displacing ﬁrm except in the lowest quartile.March 20, 2002 18
notice, the results are suggestive of the beneﬁcial effect to workers of advance no-
tice. On the other hand, accelerated attrition is clearly a feature of the model used
here.Whether this accelerated attrition is beneﬁcial in a general equilibrium frame-
work, for instance through improved reallocation of workers, remains to be deter-
mined in future work.March 20, 2002 19
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6 Tables
Table 1: Comparison of displacement measures
Year Farber (2001) LEHD UI records









1993 0.109 0.039 0.252
1994 0.031 0.130
1995 0.115 0.030 0.081
1996 0.034 0.083




1: Source: Farber (2001), Appendix Table 2b, Total Three-Year Rate
of Job Loss, deﬁned as “At least one displacement in the past three
years, Discounted Other Job loss.”
2: Source: LEHD data sources. At least one displacement in the past
4 quarters, as of 31 December. For other data restrictions, consult
the text.
3: Source: LEHD data sources. At least one displacement in the past
12 quarters, as of 31 December.March 20, 2002 22
Table 2: Person summary statistics
Displaced Early leavers
Variable Mean ( Std Dev ) Mean ( Std Dev )
Raw Earnings difference 0.089 ( 0.344 ) 0.224 ( 0.876 )
FQ Earnings difference 0.083 ( 0.449 ) 0.189 ( 0.979 )
Person characteristics:
Education 13.217 ( 2.503 ) 12.897 ( 2.672 )
Race: Black 0.101 ( 0.301 ) 0.142 ( 0.349 )
Race: Hispanic 0.038 ( 0.192 ) 0.069 ( 0.254 )
Race: Other 0.062 ( 0.242 ) 0.064 ( 0.245 )
Age ﬁrst observed 38.709 ( 9.592 ) 33.605 ( 9.586 )
Total experience (Q) 94.827 ( 38.937 ) 77.332 ( 37.269 )
 person ﬁxed effect 0.0156 ( 0.574 ) -0.005 ( 0.601 )
Pre-displacement job:
Log FQ earnings 9.072 ( 0.642 ) 8.583 ( 0.987 )
FQ earnings 10822.50 (24432.37 ) 8339.97 (20407.22 )
Number of establishments ( ) ( )
Average employment 4312.18 ( 6483.07 ) 2094.77 ( 4750.87 )
  ﬁrm ﬁxed effect 0.173 ( 0.311 ) 0.032 ( 0.332 )
Post-displacement job:
Log FQ earnings 9.156 ( 0.672 ) 8.771 ( 0.934 )
FQ earnings 12113.46 (29064.07 ) 9228.63 ( 12452.13 )
Number of establishments 21.075 ( 56.535 ) 8.950 ( 37.711 )
Average employment 4425.03 ( 6726.57 ) 1949.47 ( 5449.03 )
  ﬁrm ﬁxed effect 0.177 ( 0.313 ) 0.070 ( 0.342 )
Temporary layoffs 0.616 ( 0.486 ) 0.029 ( 0.169 )
Unemployment duration 1.722 ( 0.614 ) 1.455 ( 0.923 )
Industry stayers 0.894 ( 0.307 ) 0.528 ( 0.499 )
Observations 26955 2486
Source: LEHD data sources, 10 percent random sample, authors’ computations. For computation
of  and  , see Appendix A.March 20, 2002 23
Table 3: Person summary statistics: restricted unemployment
Displaced Early leavers
Variable Mean ( Std Dev ) Mean ( Std Dev )
FQ Earnings difference 0.097 ( 0.563 ) 0.275 ( 0.985 )
Raw Earnings difference 0.097 ( 0.451 ) 0.321 ( 0.873 )
Person characteristics:
Education 12.981 ( 2.560 ) 12.940 ( 2.658 )
Race: Black 0.097 ( 0.296 ) 0.132 ( 0.338 )
Race: Hispanic 0.053 ( 0.225 ) 0.066 ( 0.249 )
Race: Other 0.067 ( 0.250 ) 0.070 ( 0.255 )
Age ﬁrst observed 36.981 ( 9.896 ) 33.269 ( 9.604 )
Total experience (Q) 94.973 ( 40.421 ) 75.879 ( 37.131 )
 person ﬁxed effect -0.016 ( 0.582 ) 0.040 ( 0.589 )
Pre-displacement job:
Log FQ earnings 9.008 ( 0.718 ) 8.566 ( 1.018 )
FQ earnings 10842.03 (38202.04 ) 8118.37 ( 13298.63 )
Number of establishments ( ( )
Average employment 1353.13 ( 3671.38 ) 1865.42 ( 4412.53 )
  ﬁrm ﬁxed effect 0.160 ( 0.286 0.018 ( 0.329 )
Post-displacement job:
Log FQ earnings 9.107 ( 0.733 ) 8.840 ( 0.918 )
FQ earnings 12102.69 (39990.83 ) 9703.76 ( 13277.08 )
Number of establishments 10.799 ( 28.813 ) 8.420 ( 38.384 )
Average employment 1749.99 ( 4981.06 ) 1921.45 ( 5511.89 )
  ﬁrm ﬁxed effect 0.172 ( 0.284 ) 0.082 ( 0.332 )
Temporary layoffs 0.071 ( 0.256 ) 0.008 ( 0.089 )
Unemployment duration 0.982 ( 0.130 ) 0.955 ( 0.207 )
Industry stayers 0.785 ( 0.410 ) 0.510 ( 0.500 )
Observations 9021 1734
Source: LEHD data sources, 10 percent random sample, authors’ computations. For computation
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A Data construction
The full LEHD data base as used for this research has 219,414,147 observations for
17,381,486 unique workers and z unique ﬁrms. To construct the sample of ﬁrms, all
quarters in which ﬁrms satisﬁed the displacement deﬁnition were retained. Only
ﬁrms having a single displacement were retained. 34.9 percent of all ﬁrms having
at least one displacement event have multiple displacement events. Inspection of the
data reveals that a large fraction look like temporary layoffs of more than one quarter
in length; however, very cyclical ﬁrms will appear to have multiple “displacements”
in the data. The restriction used here is designed to eliminate these cyclical layoff
patterns.
All workers having worked within a three year window around the displacement
were extracted. Only workers having experienced no more than 4 displacements were
retained, eliminating about 0.19 percent of all workers ( slightly more than 6 thou-
sand individuals).
To speed up analysis, a random 10 percent sample of people was taken, yielding
a data set with 309 706 workers and 8 391 992 quarterly wage observations. We
further restrict the sample to the men with more than 5 years of labor market expe-
rience, leaving 3 562 101 observations for 133 998 workers. This constitutes our basic
analysis sample.
Inspection of the data revealed data quality issues in 1991-1992, generating an
artiﬁcially high displacement rate in these years. In the analysis, only workers dis-
placed in years 1993-1997 are included.
For some of the analysis, we use person- and ﬁrm-speciﬁc productivity factors,
^  and ^  . These are computed from the full LEHD data base using OLS based on
Equation (16) on page 12 with all displacement dummies set to zero. Dependent
variable is full-time-equivalent FQ earnings, where an adjustment has been made
based on an individual’s imputed full-time or part-time status. Mean ^  is normalized
to zero in the population of workers, weighted by the number of wage observations
for each workers. ^   is set to zero for one arbitrary ﬁrm. Its mean is restricted to be
zero across all wage observations. See Abowd & Kramarz (1999) for a more detailed
explanation of the estimation procedures used in this step of the data preparation.
Employment used to select ﬁrms is computed as a moving two-period average of all
workers appearing during one quarter. This is then averaged over the entire period a
ﬁrm appears in the data to obtain average employment.
Temporary layoffs are deﬁned as workers whose ﬁrst job after separation is with
the same ﬁrm as the displacing ﬁrm. Industry status is deﬁned at the division level,
and industry stayers are those whose ﬁrm is in the same division as the displacingMarch 20, 2002 29
ﬁrm.March 20, 2002 30
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